Anomaly Detection and Data Recovery on Mini Batch Distillation Column based Cyber Physical System by Mardyaningsih, Wedar Panji et al.
Anomaly Detection and Data Recovery on Mini 
Batch Distillation Column based Cyber Physical 
System 
Wedar Panji Mardyaningsih  
Department of Electrical Engineering 
Institut Teknologi Bandung 
 Bandung, Indonesia 
wedar.panji@s.itb.ac.id 
Pranoto Hidaya Rusmin 
Department of Electrical Engineering 
Institut Teknologi Bandung 
Bandung,Indonesia 
pranoto@lskk.ee.itb.ac.id 
Budi Rahardjo 
Department of Electrical Engineering 
Institut Teknologi Bandung 
Bandung Indonesia 
rahard@gmail.com 
Abstract— The development of industrial revolution 4.0 in 
industrial sector opened a cyber gap for outsiders to pose a 
threat to the system. Industrial control systems initially 
designed to meet SRA (Safety, Reliability, and Availability) 
priorities are now beginning to be pressed to consider security 
aspects related to the magnitude of the impact that can be 
caused due to external attacks. In making a safe Cyber 
Physical System (CPS) based automation, risk assessment will 
be used to determine the level risk of threat. Mini distillation 
column batch based CPS will be implemented as the approach 
of CPS in industrial sector. Anomaly detection based data-
driven model and data recovery method is proposed to lower 
the impact of attack on this system. 
Keywords—CPS, anomaly detection, data recovery, risk 
assessment 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years the industry has increasingly developed 
into the realm of connectivity between automatics and cyber, 
known as the industrial revolution 4.0. The industry begins to 
enter the stage where data from production machines can be 
collected and shared in real time [1]. This development 
makes the physical system and cyber becomes integrated as 
Cyber Physical System (CPS). As the physical system is 
integrated with cyber, security aspects must be considered 
especially when the system has a large impact on society [2]. 
However physical system that already integrated with 
cyber system will become more vulnerable because of the 
opportunity to be controlled remotely, the lack of a proper 
security mechanism, the exchange of data that is quite 
critical, and the vendor's low priority in taking into account 
security aspects when create the physical system [3]. 
Furthermore at the beginning, the control systems 
development in the industry was not designed to prioritize 
security aspects but more to availability aspects for 
increasing production [2]. 
The application of cyber technology opens a gap that is 
large enough to launch attacks on industrial processes. Based 
on the global annual IT security risks survey on 2017 
conducted by Kaspersky Lab and B2B International, from 
over 900 surveyed industrial company, there are 28% of 
them admitted that they faced an attack in 2017, compared to 
20% in 2016.  It is also revealed that 48% of the company 
lack of insight and having difficulties on identifying 
cyberattacks [4]. Direct attacks occurred in 2000 when a 
former employee damaged the operation of a sewage 
treatment system in Queensland, Australia. This former 
employee changes the configuration at the pumping station 
so that raw waste material in large capacities meets the road 
and environment [5]. Increasing cases of cyberattack and 
threats make it is necessary to identify and implement the 
right solution [3]. 
One of the CPS applications in the industrial field is in 
the oil industry. Where one of the important processes in this 
stage of industry is distillation to obtain pure products from 
distilled liquids [6]. On a large scale, data related to 
production in the oil industry will be transmitted wirelessly 
to devices in the field. Wireless data transmission has a 
concept similar to the implementation of smart grid [7].  
Recent studies [8] already implementing CPS on mini 
distillation column as the prototype of oil industry. Data 
from sensors in the plant, which are boiler temperature 
sensors, upper column temperatures, and concentration 
sensors will be transmitted through the Message Queuing 
Telemetry Transport (MQTT) protocol to the controller. The 
controller will do computation to create control signal based 
on data sensor that already transmitted. However this system 
has not considering the safety term yet. As the 
implementation is using MQTT protocol for the 
communication, several research already conduct to 
determine the threat and attack scenario that could be happen 
on system that used this protocol.  Several attacks on data 
privacy, authentication, integrity, and port obscurity could 
happen on MQTT [9]. 
Data integrity of sensor is important to derived the 
control signal for physical system. Therefore, the sensor data 
value must be monitored during operations to prevent the 
occurring of failed data. Failed sensor data could lead into 
the enlarged of control signal. There are two categories to 
provide system working condition information, which are 
model-based method and data driven method [10]. Model-
based method is appropriated on achieving precise and stable 
prediction result of the system condition. However data 
driven method is much easier to be implemented on most 
system because it is only depend on data monitoring of the 
system. 
This paper is organized as follows; in section II the 
author will explain about risk assessment conducted as a 
method to define the risk on the system. Section III will 
present the experiments and analysis of anomaly detection. 
Section IV will represent the recovery method when attack 
happen. Finally section V will present the conclusion and 
future work. 
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II. RISK ASSESSMENT
Risk assessment is intended to determine possible 
threats, risks, and vulnerabilities that might occur in the 
system. On this research, risk assessment conducted based 
on NIST SP-300 standards. 
A. System Characterization 
The CPS architecture was built using a plant in the form 
of a mini distillation column intended for alcohol distillation. 
In the system architecture built, there are a Mini PC as 
broker MQTT, a database server as the control signal 
computation unit, and several sensor and actuator transmitter 
[8]. This architecture can be seen on figure 1.  Local network 
communication protocol is implemented by MQTT protocol 
that connects local controllers, sensors, local brokers and 
database servers. This paper will focused on analyzing the 
risk assessment on local network as it has direct impact on 
the physical system operations. 
Fig. 1. CPS architecture implemented on mini distillation column batch 
B. Threat Identification 
Threats are the possibility of something from outside the 
system that can generate vulnerabilities in the system so that 
the function of the system cannot run as it should. Identifying 
threats is done by determining the source of the threat and 
the action of the threat based on examples of cases that have 
occurred and possible identification based on the current 
system. As mentioned in [3] the source of the threat to the 
MQTT protocol can be defined as follows external attacker, 
curious user, and malicious internal user. The types of threat 
from [3], [9], [11]  is summarized on figure 2. 
Fig. 2. Threat model analysis on mini distillation column batch based CPS 
C. Risk Analysis 
Risk analysis is done to determine the level of risk in the 
system. To determine the level of risk, the threat model has 
to be analyzed in the term of considering the likelihood of 
threat to exploit the vulnerabilities and the impact of threat to 
the system.  
Likelihood analysis is conduct with classify each threat 
into three levels, namely: 
• High : easy method to conduct threat, control not
effective 
• Medium : medium knowledge to conduct threat, control
can detain the threat 
• Low : hard method, control can prevent or stops the
threat 
Impact analysis is conduct with classify each threat into 
three levels, namely: 
• High : permanent impact, system operation stops
• Medium : temporary impact, system still can operate
even the performance is decreasing
• Low : temporary impact, system performance still good
Determining the level of risk is done using the risk-level 
matrix in table 1. 
TABLE I.  RISK LEVEL MATRIX 
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50x1.0=50 
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Medium 
50x0.5=25 
Medium 
100x0.5=50 
Low(0.1) Low 10x0.1=1 
Low 
50x0.1=5 
Low 
100x0.1=10 
From the analysis, the threat with high risk level is data 
tampering/modification because in the term of control, the 
modification of data could lead into high error when system 
is running. Besides that the current system has no mitigation 
action to prevent data tampering on system 
D. Data Tampering Scenario 
The scenario in the case of system modification is 
compiled to describe a number of scenarios that will be 
taken to be reviewed as a case so that an effective solution 
can be obtained. Data tampering is an action of inserting, 
deleting, or altering the information [3]. On this paper, 
inserting false data will be used as the scenario of data 
tampering. Attacker will insert invalid value of 
concentration sensor to broker. When database get the 
invalid data, the decision made by computation of control 
signal will have disturbed by the invalid data. The author 
make assumption that control signal transmission has safe 
connection. 
Fig. 3. Data tampering scenario using invalid data insertion 
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III. DETECTION OF ATTACK
There are two approaches on detecting the attack in the 
case of modification data attacks, namely using anomaly 
data approach and delay node approach. Anomaly is defined 
as the process of findings patterns in dataset whose behavior 
is normal or not [12]. On this paper the author will use data 
anomaly approach as the model of system. In anomaly data 
approach, the attack on the system will be modelled as 
disturbance. Because the scenario of modification happened 
on the transmission of concentration sensor data, the 
disturbance will be added at sensor data feedback as the 
figure 4. 
Fig. 4. Data modification as disturbance on closed loop system 
The concentration value of the sensor in normal 
conditions will be modeled using a Neural Network (NN). 
NN consists of some computational units called neuron. An 
input received on neuron will be multiplied by 
corresponding edge weight. The sum of weight will be 
applied by activation function to produce output as equation 
(1). The weight and neuron bias will be updated recursively 
until error between output prediction and actual output is 
converged [13].   
ݕ௞ = ܹ. ݔ௞ିே ൅ ܾ      (1) 
where : 
• ݕ௞  : output from sensor reading
• ܹ : weight matrix
• ݔ௞ିே : state matrix
• ܾ : bias
In this implementation feed-forward neural network, loss 
function was used in the form of mean squared error (MSE) 
to predict the continue output as equation (2). 
       ܯܵܧ = ଵே ∑ ൫ݕ௧௥௨௘ െ ݕ௣௥௘ௗ௜௖௧൯
ଶே௜ୀଵ         (2) 
where N is the sum of data. 
This modeling is done using open loop control on 70% 
and 80% reflux ratio. In this experiment, data at time t has 
relation with the data before at t-1. Because of that the 
model uses the first data as an input and the next data as an 
output. This method is then carried out sequentially from the 
first data until the last data as figure 5. The chosen model 
was the one which has lowest train loss (figure 6) and the 
prediction was fit enough with test data (figure 7). 
Fig. 5. Data sequence on system modelling 
Fig. 6. Train loss 
Fig. 7. Prediction and actual data in normal condition 
The model that has been obtained is then used to predict 
the concentration value when the system operates. The 
sensor value prediction is done in real time with the input 
being the actual sensor value at that time. Predicted values 
are then compared with actual values. The difference 
between these values is called prediction error as in equation 
(3).  
݁ݎݎ݋ݎ௣௥௘ௗ௜௖௧௜௢௡ = ݕ௧௥௨௘ െ ݕ௣௥௘ௗ௜௖௧      (3) 
The decision rule is formulated as if the prediction error 
is less or equal to the threshold level then the algorithm 
indicates normal behaviour, otherwise it is anomaly 
(abnormal) [14]. This decision rule then implemented on 
this paper as the difference in value above the threshold will 
indicate the modification of data. While the error value 
below the threshold will be considered as noise. 
The threshold is determined by approaching the error 
prediction as noise of sensor reading. It can be seen from 
table II that the maximum error prediction from several 
experiment conditions is 13.56. Therefore the threshold to 
differentiate between anomaly and process noise will be 
13.56. 
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TABLE II.  ERROR PREDICTION FROM OPEN LOOP AND CLOSED LOOP 
CONDITION 
System Condition Error Prediction Min Max Range 
Open loop 70% reflux 3.23E-04 13.5164 13.52 
Open loop 80% reflux 9.16E-05 13.5643 13.56 
Closed loop Kp 1 7.63E-06 12.2996 12.30 
 
The detection experiment was carried out by injecting 
false concentration data sensor. This false data will destruct 
the mean average of sensor data detected by database 
computer. The injections were held several times like it can 
be seen in figure 8. 
 
Fig. 8. Anomaly detection on 70% reflux setting 
Anomaly detection mechanism will give notification 
when it detects the attack. The notification can be seen in 
figure 9. 
 
Fig. 9. Anomaly report on attack detection  
 
IV. DATA RECOVERY 
The CPS-based mini distillation system has a higher level 
of complexity compared to other IT systems. Moreover the 
system requires a continuous operation so that if the system 
is turned off to take an incident response action, it will cause 
a loss. Thus a new approach is needed. This recovery 
approach includes switching control functions to system 
failure. In this situation the process is still ongoing even the 
system optimality is reduced [15]. 
Data recovery is conduct to normalize the anomaly data, 
so that the control signal will not be exploding because of the 
anomaly data.  Data recovery is done using anomaly 
threshold filter to eliminate the anomaly data and kalman 
filter to eliminate noise. 
A. Kalman Filter 
Kalman filter is based on minimizing the mean square 
error recursively. Kalman filter is often used for target 
tracking, noise cancellation and other dynamics system [16]. 
There are five steps on kalman filter, which are process 
update, measurement update, covariance update, kalman gain 
computation, and error estimates update. On this paper 
kalman filter is conducted by using the actual raw value of 
concentration sensor data as the system equation. Process 
noise covariance matrix and measurement noise covariance 
matrix are made to be constant in this paper.  
  
Fig. 10. Kalman filter output on 70% reflux ratio 
 
 
Fig. 11. Kalman filter output on 80% reflux ratio 
As it can be seen from figure 10 and 11, the noise was 
reduced so that the image becomes clearer. However some 
anomaly point still can be seen like a glitch on several points. 
It is because the filter system input still used actual raw data 
that the anomaly is still considered as normal data in this 
section.  
 
B. Anomaly Threshold 
Several approaches has been created on recover 
anomalous sensor data. As in [17], mutual information level 
between sensors is used to determine the other available 
sensors data that can be used to recover the anomalous 
sensor data. The highest mutual information sensor will be 
chosen to predicting the anomalous sensor value. 
As mentioned in [14], data is decided into anomaly when 
it has passed the threshold value of error prediction. From the 
previous part, the threshold which obtained from several 
experiments is 20% (in the scale of alcohol concentration). 
Therefore when the error prediction is above the threshold, 
the actual value will not be used to predict the next output. 
Instead the predicted value of the previous actual value will 
be the input to predict the next output. After anomaly value 
was eliminated, the results from the previous step will be the 
input for kalman filter to eliminate the noise. 
ݕ௞ = ൜ܥݔ௞						, ݓ݅ݐ݄݋ݑݐ	ܽݐݐܽܿ݇ܥݔ௞ିே						, ݓ݅ݐ݄	ܽݐݐܽܿ݇	 													(4) 
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Fig. 12. Anomaly attack scenario on closed loop proporsional controller 
Fig. 13. Concentration  output after recovery scenario and kalman filter 
After implementing anomaly threshold elimination, some 
points that have error prediction above 13.56% were 
eliminated. It results on normalized data that resemble the 
actual normal data. In figure 12 the noise is reduced and the 
anomaly point is disappeared. The same results also occurred 
on the experiment represented by figure 13.  
The experiment is also hold by comparing the distillate 
mixture ratio (DMR) between the attacked data recovery and 
non-recovery. The equation for DMR can be seen below 
ܦܯܴ = ట೏೔ೞ೟೔೗೗ೌ೟೐∙௏೏೔ೞ೟೔೗೗ೌ೟೐ట೘೔ೣ೟ೠೝ೐∙௏೘೔ೣ೟ೠೝ೐ 				  (5) 
where ߰ is the alcohol concentration(%) and V is the 
volume. As it can be seen form table III the recovery 
mechanism give improvement of system performance as the 
DMR of the system with recovery is higher than without 
recovery. 
TABLE III. DMR PERFORMANCE INDICATOR ON RECOVERY TESTING 
Condition Initial Condition Distillate Condition DMR 
Attack 30%, 3L 83%, 0.75L 69.17% 
Recovery 30%, 3L 88%, 0.8L 78.22% 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
Risk analysis is conduct to determine that data tampering 
has the highest risk level on the case of mini distillation 
column based CPS. Data driven framework for anomaly 
detection and data recovery based on neural network is 
proposed in this study. The main contributions of this article 
can be concluded that: (1) Anomaly of concentration sensor 
data can be detected in real time using neural network model 
as linear approach of the system. (2)Anomaly elimination 
based on threshold and kalman filter can be used as data 
recovery method for invalid data insertion in the case of data 
tampering attacks. In future, research works will be carried 
out to detect anomaly and recover data for other types of 
attacks. 
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